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ABSTRACT 
Rousseau’s stance on natural religion, revealed religion and their relation are outlined 
(section 1), and then his agreements and disagreements with Samuel Clarke (section 
2). After a survey of Joseph Butler's critique of deism (section 3), Rousseau’s 
arguments emerge as capable of supplying a counter-critique sufficient to show that 
deism could claim to have survived the eighteenth-century undefeated (section 4). If 
the attempted refutation of theistic arguments on the parts of David Hume and of 
Immanuel Kant was inconclusive (section 5), then the survival of deism up to the 
present turns out to represent a serious metaphysical option (section 6). 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Myths about Rousseau continue to proliferate. Thus Roger L. Emerson writes in 
Dictionary of the History of Ideas that Jean-Jacques Rousseau “undermined the 
deists’ superficial religion” (1), a verdict which would be as harsh on Rousseau as on 
the deists if, as I shall be maintaining, Rousseau largely shared their beliefs. There 
again, despite his greater sympathy for deism, E.C. Mossner, writing on ‘Deism’ in 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, relates that in Émile Rousseau’s Savoyard Vicar 
jettisons metaphysical arguments (and thus the core of natural theology, the mainstay 
of the deists) (2), despite the explicit deployment of such arguments on the part of this 
same character (see Section 1, below). 
 
A good case has admittedly been made for holding that Rousseau was not officially 
committed to all the views of the Vicaire savoyard (3), much less to all those of “the 
illustrious Clarke”, the terms in which Samuel Clarke is honoured by his character, 
the Vicaire (4). But these latter divergences place Rousseau far closer to writers 
usually regarded as deists such as John Toland, Anthony Collins and Matthew Tindal 
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than Clarke himself stood, and are consistent with the view that, sometimes 
knowingly and sometimes unknowingly, Rousseau presented effective replies to 
critics of the deists such as Samuel Clarke and Joseph Butler. So, at least, I shall be 
arguing. 
 
What the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century deists had in common, and critics such 
as Clarke and Butler sought to undermine, was a position in religious epistemology 
that was sceptical (to different degrees) about claims based on revelation, without 
rejecting belief in God grounded in natural reason (on one basis or another). It should 
accordingly be emphasised from the start that I am not using ‘deism’ in the sense 
widely employed currently in theological circles, as conveying belief in a clock-
maker God who played or plays no role after or beyond creation. This metaphysical 
stance may have some links with the position just depicted as deism, but was not held 
by most of the deists just mentioned. Even if this has sometimes been the meaning of 
‘deism’ when used pejoratively, it is not the sense relevant to a paper on the deism 
advocated by Toland and Tindal, criticised by Clarke and Butler and defended (as I 
hope to show) by Rousseau. 
 
Rousseau’s stance on natural religion (by which, as will be seen below, he meant 
religion based on nature, reason and conscience), on revealed religion and on their 
relation will first be outlined (section 1), and then his agreements with and 
divergences from Samuel Clarke (section 2). It will next prove relevant to review the 
critique of one of the ablest opponents of the deists, Joseph Butler (section 3). In the 
light of this critique, Rousseau’s arguments and stance will emerge as capable of 
supplying a counter-critique sufficient to show that deism (belief, that is, in a deity 
discernible from nature, from reason and from conscience, rather than through special 
revelation) could claim to have survived the eighteenth-century undefeated (section 
4), unless the attempted refutation of theistic arguments on the parts of David Hume 
and of Immanuel Kant (briefly reviewed in section 5) is regarded as conclusive. If 
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that attempted refutation was inconclusive, as I argue in section 5, then the survival of 
deism up to and including the present turns out to represent a serious metaphysical 
option rather than a mere historical curiosity (section 6). 
 
I: ROUSSEAU’S STANCE ON NATURAL AND REVEALED RELIGION 
Rousseau’s Émile, first published in 1762, includes the famous dialogue conducted on 
a mountain-top between a Savoyard priest or Vicaire and the young Émile. By prior 
agreement the subject of the dialogue is religious belief and its critics. In this context, 
the Vicaire conveys that the philosophers are of little or no help, each having a 
system, but each putting personal vanity before love of truth. (5) N.J.H. Dent suggests 
that this criticism applies to philosophy in general (6), but Maurice Cranston points 
out that Rousseau’s remarks here are directed mainly at the materialist metaphysics of 
philosophers such as Helvétius (7). This interpretation certainly coheres better with 
the high praise which shortly follows of “the illustrious Clarke”, well-known both as 
a theologian and as a philosopher (and longsince translated into French for non-
readers of English such as Rousseau (8)), even if this praise is consistent with 
reservations on Rousseau’s part. 
 
There is admittedly an undertone of faint praise in the passage about Clarke. Clarke’s 
system “seems ... to contain fewer things which are beyond the understanding of the 
human mind” than the other systems, which “are full of absurdities”. But as “Every 
system has its insoluble problems”, ... “these difficulties are therefore no final 
arguments, against any system”. While this remains praise of a highly qualified kind, 
there follows apparently unqualified acclamation: “Then comes the illustrious Clarke 
who gives light to the world and proclaims the Being of beings and the Giver of 
things. What universal admiration, what unanimous applause would have greeted this 
new system—a system so great, so illuminating and so simple” (9). Clearly 
Rousseau’s rejection of philosophy in matters of religion does not extend to the 
general kind of arguments for the being and attributes of God deployed by Clarke, 
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nor, accordingly, to natural theology. Not even the conditionality of “would have 
greeted” can be allowed to detract from this verdict, nor significantly to qualify the 
wholeheartedness of the Vicaire’s admiration for Clarke in this passage. To 
Rousseau’s overall attitude to Clarke I return in section II. 
 
While the Savoyard proceeds to deploy his own version of the cosmological 
argument, and to argue for the existence, omnipotence and benevolence of God, it is 
clear that, for him, religion is grounded in a combination of reason and feeling, and 
develops at least as much out of conscience, the innate sense of justice, which he 
regards as God’s voice, implanted in all human beings by the creator, as from 
arguments such as Clarke’s, and such as his own. Yet reason in the form of the 
cosmological argument remains the mainstay of his position, as it was for the earlier 
deists. This entire stance, as Émile remarks, closely resembles natural religion, 
something which the orthodox wrongly regard as irreligion (10).  
 
On the subject of revelation, by contrast, the Savoyard declares an attitude of (at 
most) respectful doubt, at the same time conveying hostility to the confusions and 
contradictions of supposedly revealed doctrines. His tone here diverges hugely from 
that of Clarke and again resembles instead that of the English deists, except insofar as 
one of their number (Tindal) detected implicit but unintentional deism in Clarke (11). 
Likewise miracles are treated as an impediment to faith in the author of the regular 
laws of nature (12), rather as most of the English deists had treated them. The beauty 
of the Gospel is recognised, and yet the Savoyard also declares it “full of incredible 
things, things repugnant to reason, things which no natural man can understand or 
accept” (13). Before submitting his reason to such things, reasons must be given him, 
he insists (14); this is where the defenders of revelation fail. 
 
Hence his exposition of religious matters, without explicitly rejecting revelation 
outright, credits nothing but natural religion. God is to be worshipped, but dogmas 
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with no bearing on morality are to be ignored, says the Savoyard, in a passage 
reminiscent of Lord Herbert of Cherbury (15). God is to be served according to 
knowledge based on reason, and feelings based on natural law as recognised by 
conscience. Nothing more is needed; indeed revelations are probably to be rejected, 
as degrading God by investing him with passions like our own (16). As Reason 
asserts, in dialogue with Inspiration, “He who denies the right of reason, must 
convince me without recourse to her aid”; appeals against the deliverances of reason 
are either covert appeals to reason, or they are groundless (17).  
 
There is no reason to doubt that the exposition of the Savoyard broadly expresses 
Rousseau’s personal position certainly about religion and largely about metaphysics 
too, although, as Roger D. Masters argues, Rousseau seems to have preferred not to 
acknowledge that he held these views, nor to make them part of his official 
philosophical system, granted his professed epistemological view that because of the 
limits of human reason these questions are beset with uncertainty, by contrast with 
matters of history and of morals (18). Despite his reluctance to profess these views as 
his official philosophical position about religion, and despite his continuing 
awareness that all systems were open to objections, these views certainly appear to 
have been his authentic, deliberate and persistent personal sentiments from around his 
fortieth year onwards, as he was to affirm explicitly in his later years (19). 
 
II: ROUSSEAU AND  ‘THE ILLUSTRIOUS CLARKE’ 
Besides championing the cosmological argument, Samuel Clarke argued in favour of 
revelation, of the consilience of natural religion and Christianity, and of the 
reasonableness of revelation in the light of the evidence of miracles and other signs. 
Human depravity makes the Christian revelation indispensable. Thus not only did he 
criticise individual deists such as Toland; his overall stance was fiercely hostile to 
deism in general (20). Accordingly, and despite the stance of the Savoyard on themes 
concerning revelation (noted in the previous section), the apparent praise on the part 
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of this same character for Clarke and his philosophical system may seem an obstacle 
to the thesis that Rousseau supplies a viable defence of deism. 
 
However, the areas of agreement between the Savoyard and Clarke are limited. Both 
subscribe to the cosmological argument, albeit in somewhat different forms. And both 
maintain that matter cannot be the original source of motion in the universe, and is 
incapable of feeling and perception; and also that human beings are capable of 
initiating movement, and of freedom of thought and will (21). However, the Savoyard 
does not regard the cosmological argument as a demonstration of God’s existence (as 
opposed to the least doubtful solution to the ‘insuperable problems’ which can be 
raised against any metaphysical system); his faith is based as much on appeals to 
experiential considerations as on this argument. Already we find a complete 
divergence of epistemological method, reflected in the frequent appeals of the 
Savoyard to observation and experience (22).  
 
There are also differences of substance. Thus Clarke denies that physical sensation is 
an attribute of the body, whereas the Savoyard holds that sensations are determined 
by material processes, and that the soul is limited to activities of willing and 
reflection (23). For Clarke, morality is grounded in truths known to God and 
knowable by humanity, but for the Savoyard it is discerned by conscience, which 
naturally imparts the duties that human beings should follow, whereas rationalism in 
ethics leads us astray (24). And while, for Clarke, God’s existence is conceptually 
necessary (25), the Savoyard’s conclusion is that God “exists of himself alone”, an 
independence that would seem not to betoken conceptually necessary existence, and 
further that while everything else depends on God, his nature is largely hidden and 
eludes human attempts at understanding (26). 
 
So there are large differences both of method and of substance, independent of the 
antithetical approaches of Clarke and the Savoyard to the claims of Christian 
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revelation. In this connection, Clarke in fact held that people who accept natural 
religion but deny revelation are on a slippery slope to atheism. Yet the stance 
pilloried by Clarke was the very position of the Savoyard (27), despite his professed 
admiration of Clarke, and there is no reason to doubt that it was also the position of 
Rousseau himself, who could actually have cited his broad agreement with Clarke 
over natural religion as well as his distrust of philosophical systems to resist any 
charge of creeping atheism against himself.  
 
The Savoyard’s high praise of Clarke has to be set alongside these huge divergences. 
Rousseau seems to have wanted to appeal to a ‘respectable authority’ in areas of 
agreement between Clarke and the Vicaire, in order to secure a more favourable 
hearing overall for the views that he presented through the mouth of the Savoyard 
(28). Clarke would doubtless have been appalled at this use of his name and 
reputation. 
 
III: BUTLER’S ARGUMENT AGAINST DEISM 
Since Rousseau apparently did not read English (29), he may never have come across 
the celebrated critique of deism penned by Joseph Butler. Nonetheless this critique 
now requires attention, since it has often been regarded as a conclusive refutation of 
deism, supposedly showing that deists are rationally obliged to accept revealed 
religion in addition to their deism. Before Rousseau’s confutation of such anti-deistic 
positions is investigated, it is appropriate to review Butler’s case. 
 
Butler’s overall stance is that there is a significant probability that Christianity is true, 
and that, since ‘to us, probability is the very guide of life’ (30), we ought, on grounds 
of prudence, to be guided in a matter of such importance by this probability. While 
revealed religion is less than certain, the obstacles to acceptance of its distinctive 
tenets are no stronger than the obstacles to acceptance of natural religion (including 
belief in God’s existence and purposive government of nature), which deists profess 
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to accept, and the probabilities concerned are comparable, granted that the limits of 
human faculties prevent more than probable belief in both cases (31). As Terence 
Penelhum expresses the matter, ‘[p]arity of reasoning requires that if we accept [the] 
claims [sc. of natural religion] in the face of the objections to them, we should be 
willing to do the same for the claims of revelation’ (32). Besides (and here Butler 
steps outside analogical reasoning to develop a line of argument which, as we have 
seen, was deployed also by Clarke), the ‘claims of revelation are supported by special 
evidences such as miracles [and] fulfilled prophecies’ (33) and this enhances the 
rationality of accepting them, a conclusion that was to be firmly rejected by Rousseau 
(34). 
 
What is particularly strange in someone taking this stance is Butler’s apparent 
acceptance of the Cosmological Argument, again as presented by Samuel Clarke. 
This argument is recognised as an a priori proof in the Introduction of Analogy (35), 
and is summarised with approval in the main text (36). But an a priori proof offers a 
far higher degree of probability for its conclusion than mere analogical reasoning or 
than just a significant probability of not being false. To be consistent with his other 
remarks about probability, Butler would have to claim that there are severe limits to 
the degree of probability offered even by this argument, invoking (imaginably) 
considerations such as the finitude of human faculties. Otherwise he would have to 
choose between retracting the claim that nothing stronger than probability is to be had 
in matters of religion, and thus the basis of his architectonic argument from analogy, 
and retracting his endorsement of the a priori argument. Yet this latter option would 
involve the risk that readers persuaded by such a retractation might abandon their 
deism, and thus cease to be open to persuasion by Butler’s central argument. Besides, 
Butler has strong motives for avoiding any move which might detract from the high 
probability (if not the certainty) of the doctrines of natural religion; for, as Penelhum 
remarks, ‘this, and only this, permits him to follow in Aquinas’s footsteps and say 
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that revelation supplements and completes them, and is rendered more rationally 
acceptable by the assumption of their truth’ (37). 
 
At other times, however, and in other contexts, Butler has strong motives for 
representing the doctrines of natural religion as only moderately likely. These motives 
arise, as Penelhum points out, when he is arguing that the evidence of nature does not 
unambiguously support these doctrines, but is significantly supplemented if the 
claims of revelation are accepted. Penelhum’s example of a doctrine regarded in this 
light by Butler is the doctrine that God rewards virtue and punishes vice (38). The 
application of this argument to this particular doctrine could be avoided by deists by 
relegating it from the central doctrines of natural religion, or by not counting it as one 
of these in the first place.  
 
Meanwhile, as Penelhum recognises, Butler is open to criticism for using ‘probable’ 
in some phases of his argument to mean ‘highly probable’ and in others to mean 
merely ‘having some degree of likelihood’ (39). Such equivocation already paves the 
way for one form of deistic reply to Butler: if the doctrines of natural religion are 
highly probable, then they are not genuinely analogous with those of revealed 
religion, but if they are represented as no more probable than those of revealed 
religion, this undermines the serious possibility of regarding them as a more or less 
reliable basis fit to be supplemented with the claims of revealed religion, and at the 
same time may well under-represent the various grounds for accepting them. 
 
IV: ROUSSEAU’S CRITIQUE 
A further reply to Butler is, I want to suggest, supplied unawares by Rousseau 
through the mouth of the Savoyard; it also comprises a tacit but probably a conscious 
and deliberate reply to Clarke’s revelationism. For Rousseau’s character, after 
presenting at length a reasoned case for natural religion, points out that revealed 
religion is entirely dependent for its credibility on reason, and in several ways at that. 
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Thus the adherents of revealed religion cannot defensibly set it above reason, or 
remove the right of reason to question it (40), and its teachings remain subject to the 
kinds of logical scrutiny which can identify contradictions and/or implausibility, and 
by the same token can identify claims that are contrary to reason (41). (Tindal had 
argued along comparable lines (42), but Rousseau may not have been aware of this, 
and may have absorbed arguments of this kind via French deists such as Diderot in 
his pre-atheistic phase.) Besides, the relation between revealed religion and natural 
religion is not one of parallelism, much less one of symmetry (43); for the truth of 
basic doctrines of natural religion (such as God's existence and benevolence) is a 
precondition of the credibility of claims to revelation (44), and claims purporting to 
attest a revelation, being human claims, can only be endorsed if they stand up to 
reasoned investigation (45), of a kind that in the circumstances could easily last for 
and require a lifetime (46). 
 
Effectively, the upshot is that the Savoyard’s religious beliefs consist, as he expounds 
them, in ‘nothing but natural religion’ (47), despite his overt respect for certain 
instances of purported revelation. While this need not be taken as Rousseau’s official 
stance on religion, his character nevertheless explains and defends this position to 
Émile in ways that could serve among responses to advocates of revealed religion 
such as Clarke and Butler. Thus there can be no blame or guilt for those not 
submitting to purported revelations ‘so long as I serve God according to the 
knowledge he has given to my mind, and the feelings he has put into my heart’; 
according, that is, to the deliverances of reason and of conscience (48). No benefit 
either to morals or to worthwhile beliefs can be derived from ‘positive doctrine which 
cannot be derived without the aid of this doctrine by the right use of my faculties’ 
(49). If a benevolent God exists, he conveys all that is needed in religion ‘to our 
conscience and to our reason’ (assisted by our senses); otherwise he is not benevolent. 
Besides, while this does not yet rule out the possibility of God speaking to our 
faculties through revelations imparted to others, in fact the purported revelations of 
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others, far from adding anything valuable, tend to add contradictions, to ascribe to 
God degrading and excessively human attitudes, and to generate pride, intolerance 
and cruelty among believers (50). While this critique of revelation in general might 
seem too sweeping, and might leave one or another purported revelation relatively 
unscathed, it forms only part of the Savoyard’s case, which proceeds to a detailed 
appraisal (too detailed to be considered here) of the credibility of particular 
revelations and of apparently supportive items such as alleged miracles. 
Characteristic is the claim that the creator of rational creatures cannot be supposed 
with any consistency to expect these creatures to subject their reason to authority, or 
to supposedly revealed teachings that are less clear, simple or comprehensible than 
the teachings of natural religion (51). 
 
Though probability was not Rousseau’s central concern, as it was Butler’s, the 
Savoyard is allowed to raise numerous issues surrounding the probability and 
credibility of revealed religion and its particular manifestations. Indeed these 
epistemological concerns cohere well with Rousseau’s characteristic stress on the 
uncertainty of reasoning in the field of metaphysics, an emphasis that could be held in 
some ways to match Butler’s stress on the limits of human knowledge, particularly in 
matters that transcend nature, and with Rousseau’s further characteristic recognition 
that he had never been able to remove all the difficulties facing his personal religious 
and metaphysical beliefs. Thus the assumptions of the two writers were not 
completely at variance. But with Rousseau, the self-consciousness that awareness of 
epistemological limits can generate consistently takes the form, at least in the 
discourse of the Savoyard, of scrutinising the reasonableness of doctrines whose 
adherents allege them to be above reason and above question (52), the authenticity of 
related texts, and the probability of related claims about prophecies or miracles (53). 
Supposedly revealed doctrines (the Savoyard not unreasonably argues) are fit to be 
credited only if they survive such a scrutiny at the bar of reason. 
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At the more general level of methodology, the Savoyard conveys that if adherents of 
these doctrines assert their rational superiority to the deliverances of ordinary, natural 
reason (whether in the form of natural  religion or in that of the scrutiny of their own 
credentials), and seek to persuade us to distrust what natural reason conveys, then 
they must perforce appeal to that very reason that they maintain to be at least 
defective and possibly corrupt (54). However, revelationists who claim that the 
reason of the unconvinced is corrupted by sin are in no position to appeal to reason to 
convince them (55). This would probably comprise Rousseau’s reply to the twentieth-
century revelationist, Karl Barth, who, after reporting the Savoyard’s discourse blow 
by blow, rightly remarks Rousseau’s originality in compehensively rejecting 
revelation as in any way distinct from ‘the inherent development of humanity’ and 
human reason, an originality easily transcending that of contemporary ‘neologians’ 
including Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (56), but implicitly rejects Rousseau’s entire 
position, as grounded in misconceptions about the sufficiency of human reason and 
the uncorrupted nature of the human heart (57). Rousseau could both challenge the 
dogmatic assumption that these are misconceptions, and maintain that insofar as his 
opponents rely on reason, they precisely grant him the very ground on which he 
stands. 
 
If, however, revelationists could somehow cast doubt upon the principles of reason 
(such as the law of non-contradiction or the arguments of natural theology), says the 
Savoyard’s defender of Reason in dialogue with a defender of Inspiration (in a 
passage that unwittingly turns the tables on Butler), far from helping revealed religion 
this would engender uncertainty about the very existence of God (58). But granted 
Rousseau’s reasonable contention that reason cannot undermine itself, and his related 
claim that the key tenets of natural religion, as opposed to revealed religion, are 
capable of reasoned support, there is no need for anyone accepting Rousseau’s 
premises to endorse either Butler’s suggestion that natural religion is beset by the 
same difficulties as revealed religion, or Clarke’s view that revelation is necessary to 
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overcome the defects of reason resulting from human depravity (59). (Some 
contemporary suggestions that the tenets of natural religion are nevertheless incapable 
of reasoned support for other reasons will be considered in the next section.) 
 
Thus, Rousseau’s character the Savoyard supplies a reasoned critique of positions 
such as Clarke’s which also effectively answers much of Butler’s case, and at the 
same time serves to rehabilitate many aspects of the general position of the English 
deists. Not surprisingly, the publication of this passage resulted in Rousseau being 
exiled both from Catholic France and from the Protestant cantons of Switzerland (60). 
But since this critique might itself seem vulnerable to criticisms of the theistic 
arguments such as those advanced by Rousseau’s friend and contemporary, David 
Hume, and later in the century by Immanuel Kant, a brief appraisal of their critique is 
in place before the conclusion that deism survived the century undefeated can be 
drawn. 
 
V: A  BRIEF REVIEW OF HUME AND KANT ON THE GROUNDS OF DEISTIC 
AND THEISTIC BELIEF 
It is often claimed that David Hume destroyed the theistic arguments to a first cause 
and to a cosmic designer (61). If so, then the core of Rousseau’s deism would also 
have been undermined thereby, as well as the most cogent rational basis for theistic 
religions such as Christianity, Judaism and Islam. 
 
However, as I have argued elsewhere, Hume’s criticisms in the Dialogues of a priori 
arguments in metaphysics are made to turn on God’s existence being regarded as 
conceptually necessary. This was indeed a feature of Clarke’s arguments, but not of 
all versions of the cosmological argument, as deployed during that century. The 
arguments of Clarke’s opponent, Daniel Waterland, for example, are immune from 
these criticisms (62). Further, as has been seen above, nothing in the position of the 
Savoyard or of Rousseau himself depended on conceptually necessary existence 
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either. Hume’s character, Cleanthes, purports to ‘rest the whole controversy’ (about 
the cosmological argument) on his own conclusion that ‘There is no being, therefore, 
whose non-existence implies a contradiction’ (63), while the related objections of his 
character Philo seem also to turn on this proposition (64). While there is room to 
question Cleanthes’ claim (65), the present point is that against versions of the 
cosmological argument such as that of the Savoyard (and, come to that, Waterland’s 
more persuasive version) this objection is simply irrelevant. It follows that the 
Savoyard’s arguments are unaffected by Hume’s central criticism. 
 
Hume’s Cleanthes additionally raises objections to would-be explanations of infinite 
successions of items or events (66), and Rousseau does not rule out the possibility of 
an infinite past (67). But he could have replied that causal explanations need not 
involve antecedent factors as causes, and that infinite successions might remain 
amenable to causal explanations of in terms of simultaneous causation. Besides, if he 
had been shown an early draft of Hume’s ‘Dialogues’ (something that might just 
possibly have actually happened during his exile in Britain in the late 1760s) and had 
grasped their meaning, he could have pointed out that Hume’s Demea is allowed to 
anticipate and parry Cleanthes’ objections in advance when he remarks that even 
infinite collections raise explanatory issues, such as why this particular collection or 
succession exists and not another, or none at all (68). The agency of a being 
unamenable to being created or destroyed, Rousseau could have added, might serve to 
resolve these otherwise inexplicable issues. Thus, as I have argued elsewhere, those 
of Hume’s objections to the cosmological argument that do not turn on conceptually 
necessary existence turn out to be inconclusive (69). 
 
Hume’s objections to the teleological argument need not have troubled Rousseau, 
who seems not to have appealed to it, at least explicitly, and in general to have sought 
to avoid arguments about God’s nature (70). Certainly in one passage the Savoyard 
argues from the laws of motion to God’s intelligence (71), but Richard Swinburne has 
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argued persuasively that Hume’s objections are inconclusive against arguments from 
such regularities of succession, as opposed to ones from synchronic order (72). On 
the problem of evil, Hume’s discussion would certainly have exercised Rousseau, but 
his Savoyard deploys a vigorous version of the Free Will Defence, and at least 
attempts to relate it to physical evil as well as to moral evil (73). 
 
Nevertheless Hume is sometimes considered to have delivered a fatal blow to deism 
by undermining in Natural History of Religion the beliefs of several of the English 
deists that current religions were corruptions of a once-universal monotheism, which 
would itself have comprised a primeval natural religion (74). But Rousseau’s deism 
seems not to have included this anthropological claim, and Rousseau could have 
maintained that deism needs to say nothing in particular about the human past, 
beyond its critique of past purported revelations. 
 
Immanuel Kant was himself in some ways a deist (in the above sense) of an 
idiosyncratic kind, to judge from his approach in Religion within the Limits of Reason 
Alone (75). Nevertheless his criticisms of theistic arguments (in Critique of Pure 
Reason) appear to strike also at Rousseau’s deism (76), even though his moral 
arguments, as in the second Critique, would (if credible) tend to uphold the view of 
Rousseau’s Savoyard that the phenomena of conscience comprise a basis for religious 
belief (77), and the contention of Kant’s Opus Postumum, that, conceived as respect 
for the moral law, conscience is the voice of God in us, seems even closer still to 
Rousseau (78). However, Kant’s arguments of the first Critique centrally claim that 
all the theistic arguments turn on the ontological argument and its key concept of a 
logically necessary being (79). Thus arguments such as Rousseau’s that neither 
employ nor imply this concept are apparently immune from his central criticism. 
 
Kant’s further criticisms of all attempts to reason in areas that lie beyond experience 
would (if sound) be a problem for Rousseau’s deism. But the claim that nothing 
 16 
beyond experience can be known (80) seems arbitrary. For this claim pre-empts 
apparently viable answers to the question of whether we can know or reasonably 
believe anything about the conditions necessary for experience to be possible, a 
question which would apparently make good sense and would apparently be 
intelligibly askable, but for the Kantian embargo on asking it. 
 
While limits of space prevent further discussion of possible counter-attacks from 
supporters of Hume and Kant, the kind of deistic position defended by Rousseau’s 
Savoyard would seem not to have been subverted or undermined by at least the 
central critiques of religion of Hume and of Kant. The same could probably be 
claimed for the theistic core of Christianity, Judaism and of Islam, if they can also be 
defended against deistic and other critiques of revelation.  
 
VI: DEISM: A SERIOUS METAPHYSICAL OPTION 
It remains to draw some broader conclusions about deism. Contrary to what is usually 
supposed, deism seems not to have been superseded or overthrown either by its 
theistic critics such as Clarke and Butler or by Enlightenment philosophers such as 
Hume and Kant. In particular, the deism of the Savoyard, and thus probably of 
Rousseau, can be defended against at least eighteenth-century criticism. This was not 
(as it may be worth re-emphasising) the kind of deism that represents God as an 
absentee designer, responsible for nothing but initiating the cosmic process, but (as 
has been mentioned above) the deism of a deity discernible from nature, from reason 
and from conscience, rather than from revelation (in the sense of ‘special 
revelation(s)’). 
 
Such deism has to defend itself on at least two fronts. Against scepticism about 
religion it deploys (besides arguments from conscience) arguments such as the 
cosmological argument, and can, I have argued, avoid the pitfalls identified by 
philosophers such as Hume and Kant. Against revelationists such as Clarke and 
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Butler it deploys its own critique of revelation, and challenges them to give reasons, if 
they can, for abandoning reason (that is, for abandoning reasoning and reasons) in 
favour of religious authority. 
 
Rousseau’s deism could be enlarged upon and defended better than is done in Émile.  
Thus it could be updated in matters of epistemology so as to secure immunity from 
possible charges of hypostatising the faculty of reason, supplemented through 
detailed text-based scrutinies of purported revelations such as the critique of the Bible 
on the part of Hermann Samuel Reimarus (as published posthumously by Lessing 
(81)), and could be upheld with a more vigorous presentation of the cosmological 
argument than that of Rousseau (82), a more explicit version of the teleological 
argument (83), and a more persuasive theodicy with regard to physical evil (84). 
More recent developments would also require such deism to be related to evolution 
and to Big Bang cosmology. But short of a latter-day vindication of Hume’s Fork, or 
of some semantic counterpart concerning the limits of intelligibility (such as the 
Verification Principle threatened but failed to be), there is every reason to consider it 
capable of such revision, and thus a metaphysical option for the third millennium, and 
not just a footnote to the history of philosophy of the eighteenth century. 
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